Economic regions, such as urban agglomerations, face external demand and price shocks that produce income risk. Workers in large and diversiÞed agglomerations may beneÞt from reduced wage volatility, while Þrms may outsource the production of intermediate goods and realize beneÞts from Chamberlinian externalities. Firms may also protect workers from wage risks through Þxed wage contracts. This paper explores the relationships between Þrms' risks, workers' contracts, and the structure of production in cities.
Introduction
As recognized long ago by Arrow and Debreu, efficient resource allocation in a world of uncertainty requires a "complete" set of markets within which risks can pooled and traded. With incomplete markets, risks may fall on agents for whom risk-bearing is costly.
Economic institutions -not just Þnancial institutions like banks and insurance companies, but all Þrms, and all contractual relationships -transmit and distribute fundamental risks. These institutional structures adapt over time to the changing fundamental structure of the economy. In this paper, we explore the transmission, pooling, relationships between industry structure, labor market contracting, and earnings risk using a model of an urban agglomeration or other spatially-integrated economic region. Industries within this region, which export products to the rest of the economy, face stochastic demands for their products, producing output and income shocks that affect the region. We investigate the simultaneous determination of industrial structure, of employment relationships, and of earnings risk, under varying assumptions about the ability of Þrms (or workers) to access Þnancial markets within which risks can be traded.
More speciÞcally, as in Ethier (1982) , assume a set of Þrms in an urban area or economic region operate under conditions of increasing returns to scale. These Þrms -henceforth called "manufacturing Þrms", for convenience -produce tradeable goods, using non-traded intermediate goods and services called "components". These intermediate commodities may be produced within the manufacturing Þrms themselves (a verticallyintegrated industrial structure) or by specialized component producers ("outsourcing").
Stochastic demand for traded goods implies that manufacturing outputs, prices, and proÞts are also random, as are derived demands for intermediate and primary inputs.
In particular, external demand shocks may result in stochastic ßuctuations in the wages received by risk-averse workers -depending on the nature of labor contracting, and in particular, on whether workers are hired at Þxed wages in advance of the realization of external demand shocks or are instead hired (and Þred) at wages that depend on these realizations. The equilibrium structure of Þrms and of employment contracts simultaneously determine the ultimate distribution of income risks among Þrms and workers within the region.
As will become apparent, a wide range of equilibrium conÞgurations is possible, depending on the underlying fundamental economic data of the regional economy. The analysis begins, in Section 2, with the speciÞcation of a basic model of regional production and employment reßecting indivisibilities at the level of export Þrms and increasing returns in the production of intermediate components as well. Section 3 proceeds under the assumption that employers cannot in any way contract with workers in advance of the realization of demand shocks and shows that equilibria can emerge with fully integrated manufacturing Þrms, manufacturing Þrms that outsource all production of components, or a mix of the two, depending on the number of manufacturing Þrms in the region. The extent of wage income risk faced by workers in equilibrium also depends on the number of manufacturing Þrms and on the degree of "diversiÞcation" of the region's industrial structure. Section 4 allows for the possibility that Þrms may be able to absorb some of the income risk otherwise borne by workers by contracting with them ex ante. Such contracts impose costs on Þrms, in part by limiting their ability to adapt employment to realized demand. Whether such contracts are found in equilibrium depends on tradeoffs between these costs and their beneÞts to risk-averse workers: a range of equilibrium conÞgurations is possible.
Although the model is, of necessity, highly stylized, it offers insights into the ways that industrial structure and the distribution of earnings, proÞt, and employment risk are simultaneously determined. We do not attempt to link the analysis closely to empirical Þndings on urban and regional production, employment, earnings, and proÞts, but note that different economic regions, in different parts of the world and at different historical periods, could fruitfully be compared using the structural determinants identiÞed below.
For example, the process of urbanization and industrialization in advanced and developing countries is often accompanied by increases in the number and diversity of major exportoriented industries and by the development of Þnancial markets within which the proÞt risks facing Þrm owners can be pooled, both of which, our analysis suggests, can affect the equilibrium degree of vertical integration and of labor contracting.
Related literature: A number of previous contributions highlight the importance of "thick" labor markets skills, qualiÞcation or training (see Helsley and Strange, 1990; Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou, 2002; or Hamilton and Thisse 2000) . Picard and Toulemonde (2004) show that Þrms and workers can increase the chance of good job matches in large regions; Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) explore this issue with integer numbers of Þrms. In Krugman (1991, Appendix) Þrms are uncertain about their costs and tend agglomerate to reduce wage variability and the risk premium paid to workers. Using a similar model but with no endogenous agglomeration, Wildasin (1995) examines the implications of integrated or pooled labor markets for the distribution of income risk and for the beneÞts and costs of tax/transfer policies that protect against such risks. These analyses ignore the possibility, explored in Section 4 below, that Þrms may explicitly or implicitly (Baily (1974) , Azariadis (1975) , Rosen (1985) ) insure workers against earnings risk.
The analysis extends previous research on diversity and specialization. Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1993) analyze specialized cities (with a single industry) versus diversiÞed cities (with two industries). Duranton and Puga (2001) discuss the migration process of Þrms from diversiÞed Chamberlinian regions to specialized factory towns. Many recent studies of economic geography postulate the existence of Chamberlinian regions where Þnal good producers outsource production of intermediate goods to small, diversiÞed, monopolistically competitive Þrms (see for instance Venables 1996) but take city structure as exogenous in the sense that downstream Þrms never integrate vertically to incorporate upstream production. As shown in Section 3, vertically integrated industries may but need not always arise when industry structure is determined endogenously.
The model
Production structure. We model a region with a predetermined number M of Þrms, each of which is the sole producer of a commodity that is sold on external markets. These Þrms form the "economic base" of the region (Tiebout (1962) ). Each Þrm j, j = 1, . . . M, faces a demand for its product given by Y j = θ j P −ε j , where P j is the price of the commodity, ε > 1 is the price elasticity of demand, and θ j ∈ [θ, θ], 0 < θ < θ < ∞, is a Þrm-speciÞc random variable that reßects demand shocks on external markets. Variations in θ j may result from ßuctuations in incomes, preferences, technologies, and prices of related goods in the rest of the world. With little loss of generality, we assume that E(θ j ) = 1 ∀j, and thus the variance and covariance of these shocks are var[
. In some instances, we assume that these random shocks are i.i.d., but we also allow for them to be correlated, including the possibility that they are perfectly correlated. A low degree of correlation of these shocks can be interpreted as a situation where the region's economic base is highly "diversiÞed", and, as we shall see, this sometimes allows for important pooling of risks; this is not possible when the demand shocks are perfectly correlated. We let θ ≡ (θ 1 , . . . , θ M ) denote the vector of random shocks.
Each of the M Þrms uses various components in the production process; for ease of reference, we henceforth refer to each of these Þrms as a "manufacturing" Þrm. As in Ethier (1982) , we can think of the production activities of these Þrms as an "assembly" process in which components are combined to yield a Þnal product, according to a CES production function
, where x j (i) is the quantity of component i in the Þnal product j; here, ρ < 1 and the elasticity of substitution between components is 1/(1 − ρ). 1 N j represents the total range of components used by Þrm j. The production of each component requires l j (i) = a + bx j (i) units of labor, where a > 0 and b > 0 are parameters that represent Þxed and variable input requirements; components are thus produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale. Letting w j denote the wage rate paid by Þrm j, the production of components thus costs c j (i) = (a + bx j (i)) w j .
In order to insure that each Þrm's proÞt and output is bounded, we assume that
This implies that ρ > 0 (components are substitutes). Note that δ < ρ and δ < ρ/ε < 1/ε.
While the manufacturing Þrms are the locus of "assembly" activities, they can produce components internally, in which case we refer to them as "integrated" manufacturers, or
they may obtain components from specialized local component producers, in which case we refer to them as "outsourcing" manufacturers. The local component producers utilize the same increasing-returns production technologies as are available to the manufacturing Þrms. In this case, we obtain an industrial structure characterized by Chamberlinian monopolistic competition in the components sector of the region's economy. One goal of the analysis is to determine endogenously which of these two structures emerges in equilibrium. For the sake of analytical tractability, we assume that outsourcing manufacturers outsource the full production of components.
Workers. There is a Þxed stock L of identical workers in the region, each supplying a single unit of labor. Each worker's utility is a concave function of the wage w; in some cases, we focus on the constant-elasticity form u(w) = w α /α for α ≤ 1. (w α /α reduces to ln(w) when α = 0.) In this case, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 1 − α.
Labor Markets. We assume that whereas Þrms have market power in the product and component markets, Þrms and workers are price and (expected) utility takers in the labor market. This price-taking condition naturally holds when the number of Þrms is large.
When the number of Þrms is small, we keep this assumption for the sake of consistency and tractability.
We allow for two possible types of employment relationships. In the Þrst, Þrms hire workers ex post (i.e., subsequent to the realization of demand shocks) in single competitive market at a wage rate of w. In the second, Þrms may contract with workers ex ante to supply their labor at a Þxed (non-state-contingent) wage w 0 . For the sake of analytical tractability, we assume that contracts are exclusive and non-renegotiable: on the one hand, Þrms are not allowed to hire additional workers ex post, to Þre contracted workers, or to reduce the contracted wage payment; on the other hand, contracted workers are obliged to offer their labor, cannot quit the Þrm or renegotiate higher wages. In contrast to Schöb and Wildasin (2002) , wage contracts not only impose constraints on labor price but also on the size of a contracting Þrm. Also, in contrast to Duranton and Combes (2001) a Þrm is not allowed to 'poach' workers from other Þrms by offering higher ex post wages.
2 In Section 3, we restrict attention to the case where hiring only occurs ex post ; later, we allow for ex ante contracting and for the endogenous determination of contracting form.
Chamberlinian Externalities
To understand the incentives to outsource, we compare the proÞts of manufacturing Þrms under integration and under outsourcing.
Integrated Manufacturers
Let M and M denote the set and the number of manufacturing Þrms and let M I and M I denote the set and the number of integrated manufacturing Þrms. Each Þrm j ∈ M I chooses the number of components, hires workers in a perfectly competitive labor market, sets its product price and, Þnally, supplies its product market.
2 BeneÞts from larger component variety in cities are not considered in Schöb and Wildasin (2002) and Combes and Duranton (2001) .
By symmetry, Þrm j produces identical quantities of components: x j (i) ≡ x j for all i. The production function then simpliÞes to Y j = x j N 1/ρ j and the Þrm's production cost is (aN j + bY j N ρ−1 ρ j )w, a convex function of N j . For any desired level of output Y j , the cost-minimizing numbers of each components and of component varieties are given by
Note that changes in output affect only the number of varieties of components, not the amount of each that is used. The optimal labor requirement and the indirect cost function
where
Cost is a sub-additive function of output. Economies of scope are internalized in the integrated Þrm so that average costs decrease with output and are larger than marginal cost. Furthermore, both marginal and average costs decrease with output at the (negative) rate ρ− 1 while inverse demand and marginal revenue functions decrease at the (negative) rate −1/ε. Under the assumption δ ≡ ρ − 1 + 1/ε > 0, interior solutions exist and yield maxima for the proÞt functions
. Equilibrium output and proÞt can then written as it follows:
where ρ δ > 1. When wages rise, the equilibrium output Y j decreases. When the Þrm faces a positive demand shock (i.e., a high value of θ j ), it increases its output and decreases its product price. Since the rise in output reduces the average Þxed cost of a component, the Þrm is therefore able to increase the number of components. In turn, a larger variety of components raises production efficiency, which decreases marginal cost and price. Finally, proÞt decreases with wages.
Labor demand by all integrated Þrms is given by
is a measure of the impact of integrated Þrms' shocks on their total demand for labor.
This is an increasing and jointly convex function of θ because δε < ρ.
We now turn to the analysis of the manufacturing Þrms that choose to outsource production to the local component producers.
Outsourcing Firms
Let M o and M o denote the set and number of outsourcing manufacturers. These Þrms outsource their production of all components to a set of Chamberlinian Þrms, each producing a single component variety. Outsourcing manufacturers are then just assembly line Þrms that use components produced by others in the region.
The component sector is subject to Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Each component maker i ∈ N produces a single component and sets a proÞt-maximizing price p(i), conditional on the realization of all demand shocks for outsourcing manufacturers.
Under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, manufacturers are price takers in the component market. Yet free entry impedes component makers to set to high prices.
Under free entry component producers' proÞts fall to zero and the number of component producers reaches its equilibrium value N .
The demand for a component is given by the sum of the outsourcing manufacturers' demands. Each outsourcing Þrm maximizes its proÞt
concave under the assumption that δ > 0. The Þrst-order condition with respect to x j (i)
implies that manufacturer j's demand for component i is given by
is the component price index in the region.
Manufacturing Þrms' proÞts can be written as function of product prices and component price index as Π j = (P j − p) Y j . The production and proÞt of each outsourcing manufacturing Þrm is computed as
where ξ ≡ (ε − 1) ε ε −ε . Aggregating across manufacturers, component producer i faces an iso-elastic demand function
is a measure of the average demand shock realized by the outsourcing manufacturers.
The supply of components is derived as follows. Each component producer i manufactures a single variety of component and hires workers in the labor market, where it is price taker. It thus maximizes p(i)x(i) − (a + bx(i)) w, treating the wage and the price index p as constants. Because of iso-elastic demand, the optimal price is a constant markup on marginal cost equal to p(i) = bw/ρ. Furthermore, free entry requires that proÞts of component producers are equal to zero. This implies that
Note that the optimal level of component production turns out to be equal to that chosen by integrated Þrms.
3
Applying these results Þrstly to (6) yields
In equilibrium, the price index of components is directly related to ex post wages. Using this last expression and (5), we can determine the equilibrium number of component Þrms:
The outsourcing manufacturer's output and proÞt are then
It is interesting to observe the impact of shocks on manufacturers' proÞts under integration and outsourcing. Suppose that w and Ψ o are constant, which approximates a situation where the region includes many Þrms with independent shocks and where the set of outsourcing manufacturers is large enough. Then, we note that the proÞt of an outsourcing manufacturer j is linear in its own shock θ j whereas it is an increasing and convex function of its own shock under integration. Hence, expected proÞts do not depend on shock variances under outsourcing whereas they rise with mean preserving increases of variance under integration. Manufacturers are then more likely to prefer to integration when they face large uncertainties. The latter conÞguration indeed offers better production ßexibility.
For instance, in the case of high demand shocks, Þrms can take beneÞt of larger economies of scope as they are able to increase their number of components.
Labor Market
A region can include integrated and outsourcing manufacturing Þrms. Integrated manufacturing Þrms compete for labor with component producers. Both types of Þrms are price takers in the labor market. Labor market clearing condition requires that
from which it follows that the equilibrium wage satisÞes
The Deterministic Case
It is instructive to consider Þrst the special case of the model where all demand uncertainty disappears (θ j = 1 ∀j). What determines whether manufacturers choose to be integrated or to outsource?
We say that the set of manufacturing Þrms are in an equilibrium conÞguration when no Þrm can proÞtably switch its own organization of production, given the organizational conÞguration of all other manufacturers. Because of the assumption that Þrms act competitively in the labor market, none believe that their choices of integration versus outsourcing have an impact on wages. For any given wage w, the ratio of proÞts under each conÞguration is equal to
It is apparent that c M is a critical value that determines manufacturers' incentives to outsource production. This proposition shows that multiple equilibria are possible (see also McLaren (2000)).
In particular, it is possible to have an equilibrium with integrated Þrms in which each
Þrm could increase its proÞts if it and all other Þrms would simultaneously switch to the alternative conÞguration. Firms thus face a coordination problem. For the sake of simplicity, we assume henceforth that some institutional structure exists (perhaps city planning, zoning, or collusion) that results in the more proÞtable conÞguration to emerge, whenever multiple equilibria are possible.
The Stochastic Case
Let us now reintroduce demand uncertainty into the model. We shall assume that Þrms must choose their organizational form prior to the realization of demand shocks. In this uncertain environment, the ex post wage is also stochastic, as shown in equation (9).
We assume throughout that manufacturing Þrms are risk neutral, that is, they seek to maximize expected proÞts. The assumption of risk neutrality for these Þrms rests on a presumption that they have access to Þnancial markets (e.g., equities markets) or are part of larger diversiÞed corporations external to the region, such that their proÞt risks are effectively shared at no cost.
We say that the set of manufacturing Þrms are in an equilibrium conÞguration when no Þrm can increase its expected proÞts by switching its own organization of production,
given the organizational conÞguration of all other manufacturers. As before, none believe that their choices of integration versus outsourcing have an impact on ex post wages. The ratio of expected proÞts under each conÞguration is given by
As in the deterministic case, the incentive for a Þrm j to choose integration or outsourcing depends on the number of outsourcing Þrms M o , but now it also depends on the nature of its own demand shocks and the correlation of those shocks with the ex post wage. Again, the incentive to outsource is high when sufficiently many other Þrms do so (M o large).
The impact of shocks is embedded in the function G j (M o , M I ) that depends on the sets of Þrms that outsource and integrate component production. In its general form, this function depends on the way manufacturers are partitioned between outsourcing and integrated structures. When there are no shocks θ j = 1 ∀j, this function is equal to 1
and Proposition 1 obviously applies. It also equal to 1 applies when shocks are symmetric and perfectly correlated θ j = θ 0 ∀j. When shocks are small (i.e., variance of θ j is small compared to its mean value 1), the function remains close to 1 and Proposition 1 applies to the stochastic case, to a Þrst order approximation.
As an important special case, Þrms whose demand shocks are identically distributed are ex ante symmetric and the identity of the Þrms that outsource or integrate is thus Þrms facing high demand uncertainty may always prefer to integrate production because this conÞguration offers better production ßexibility. An equilibrium conÞguration may then include a mix of integrated and outsourcing Þrms. Second, in the absence of ex ante symmetry, Þrm get different ex ante proÞts and may not agree on an equilibrium conÞguration.
In the sequel we solve the issue of multiplicity of equilibrium by assuming that the existence of coordinating institutions. Such institutions select the most proÞtable equilibrium conÞguration and facilitate (negotiated) agreements on possible surplus splits. Under this assumption, the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, one may readily conjecture that all manufacturers integrate in a region with few Þrms because of the lack of Chamberlinian externalities. By contrast, manufacturers will outsource in a region with numerous Þrms because of intense Chamberlinian externalities. In regions with intermediate numbers of manufacturers, outsourcing may be the choice of a subset of manufacturers.
To conclude this section, note that the equilibrium wage is, in general, dependent on the realizations of the demand for the manufacturing Þrms in the region, which means that workers face wage risk. This is true, of course, when workers are employed by integrated manufacturing Þrms, since these Þrms face stochastic demand for their products. It is also true when workers are employed by component-producing Þrms because demand shocks in external markets are transmitted through the manufacturing Þrms to the upstream component producers.
Under either type of industrial structure, the magnitude of wage risk depends on the number of manufacturing Þrms in the region M and on the joint distribution of their demand shocks. In particular, if M is large and the demand shocks are uncorrelated (the case where the θ j 's are i.i.d.), the variance of the equilibrium wage will be small: the high demand for labor by Þrms with high levels of output demand will offset the low demand for labor with low demand realizations, so that the total demand for labor is relatively stable. This corresponds to a "diversiÞed" industrial structure for the region.
If M is relatively small, however, or if external demand shocks are highly correlated, then demand for labor will vary signiÞcantly across states of nature, as will the equilibrium wage; in this case, wage risk will be high. Correlated risks may arise when the region's economic base is highly specialized around just a few types of exported commodities (the automobile industry in Detroit provides one illustration). Since demand on external markets may depend on aggregate economic conditions (the economy-wide business cycle, for instance), the case of correlated risks can also arise when there are many different types of Þrms in the region's economic base.
If workers are indifferent to risk, then the fact that wages vary stochastically in response to ßuctuations in external demand is, for them, a matter of no consequence. In practice, however, households are risk averse, and wage risk can be very costly to them.
This means that workers would value employment relationships that provide some form of insurance against wage ßuctuations. We therefore turn to an analysis of such contracting arrangements.
Ex Ante Labor Contracting
In order for workers to be protected from wage risk, they must either be able to obtain insurance that offers state-contingent payments based on wage realizations, or they must be able to contract for wages before the state of nature is known. Because of well-known issues relating to transactions costs and moral hazard, we assume that workers are unable to purchase earnings insurance individually. This means that the only opportunity to obtain protection against wage risk must come from labor contracts. In the spirit of the theory of implicit contracts (see Baily (1974) , Gordon (1974) , Azariadis (1975) ), when
Þrms are risk neutral, they can provide insurance to workers by offering labor contracts in which wages and employment are Þxed ex ante. There are of course many alternative models of labor contracting, but we focus for simplicity on contracts that are exclusive and non-renegotiable. Our principal goal is to highlight the possible relationships between contracts and the industrial structure of a region.
The previous section shows us that manufacturing can undertaken by integrated Þrms, outsourcing Þrms or mixes of both conÞgurations. We here examine labor contracting by Þrms in each structure, starting with integrated manufacturers, discussing then the case of outsourcing Þrms and Þnally studying mixes of structures. Throughout this section, we continue to assume that manufacturing Þrms have access to Þnancial markets or are otherwise sufficiently diversiÞed that they are indifferent to risk.
Labor Contracting By Integrated Manufacturers
Suppose again that L workers and M manufacturing Þrms have settled in a region and suppose that M I > 0 Þrms have chosen to integrate. Consider an integrated manufacturing Þrm j ∈ M I . We Þrst determine the properties of its wage contract and then compare the expected proÞts of this Þrm with and without such contracts. Firms can potentially hire workers ex post, in which case Þrms pay workers the stochastic equilibrium wage as described previously. Alternatively, they can offer ex ante contracts with a Þxed wage.
Firms and workers are assumed to act as price-takers both in the ex ante and ex post labor markets. This means that no Þrm can pay a wage lower than the prevailing wage in the ex ante market, w 0 , or in the ex post market, w. Equilibrium is attained when labor demand is equal to labor supply both ex ante and ex post. Suppose that Þrm j offers an ex ante contract with a wage w 0 and chooses its production level to maximize
The expected levels of output and proÞts for integrated manufacturers will be 
here EΠ I j denotes expected proÞts for an integrated manufacturer who hires labor in the ex post market.
Assuming constant relative risk aversion, the condition that u(w 0 ) = Eu(w) means that w 0α /α = Ew α /α, in which case
Observe from this condition that the incentive to hire ex ante depends on the set of Þrms Second, if all Þrms have perfectly correlated demand shocks, so that θ j = θ 0 for all j, where θ 0 is a common demand shock, then the ex post wage w becomes proportional to θ 1 ε 0 and we get that
0 /α is a more concave function than θ 1 ε 0 provided that α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, integrated Þrms with perfectly correlated demands offer ex ante contracts. The case of a single integrated Þrm may be viewed as a particular instance of the case of perfectly correlated shocks. Hence, we should expect to see ex ante labor contracting in "factory towns".
5 Note that when workers are risk neutral (i.e., α = 1) and risks are perfectly correlated, Þrms are indifferent between hiring ex ante or ex post: on the on hand, workers place no value on wage stability, and, on the other hand, Þrms gain nothing from ex post employment ßexibility. To summarize:
Proposition 2 (i) In diversiÞed regions with many manufacturers, Þrms do not contract with workers ex ante.
(ii) If manufacturers have perfectly correlated demand shocks, they do contract with workers ex ante, providing workers with actuarially fair insurance (w 0 = Ew).
(iii) When manufacturers face demand shocks that are partially correlated, equilibria are possible in which Þrms with demand shocks that are highly positively correlated with ex post wages contract for labor ex ante, while Þrms with demand shocks that are highly negatively correlated with ex post wages contract for labor ex post.
More intuition can be obtained if we study the case of small demand uncertainty (i.e., variance of θ j is small compared to its mean value 1).
Small risks. For small demand uncertainty (see Appendix), we can compute that
where w is the endogenously-determined ex post wage.
This formula conÞrms the two previous results: Þrms do not offer ex ante labor contracts when there are many Þrms and wages are almost non-stochastic, whereas they do offer such contracts when shocks are highly positively correlated. Furthermore, if workers are sufficiently risk averse, α is very negative and the inequality is not satisÞed, which is to say that ex ante contracting dominates in this case.
This formula also shows how ex ante and ex post employment contracts can co-exist:
a Þrm is more likely to hire ex ante if its demand shock has low variance or if it is facturing Þrm, but this result emphasizes the importance of lack of risk diversiÞcation as the underlying reason for ex ante labor contracting in this model.
positively correlated with the ex post wage. Indeed, if it has low variance, the Þrm does not really need production ßexibility and contracting with workers is beneÞcial. If its shock is positively correlated with ex post wages, the Þrm expects high product demand when wages are high and and low product demand when wages are low; as a consequence, its production and demand for labor is stable and ex ante contracts imposes little cost while offering wage stability to workers.
To make things even clearer, suppose that there are only integrated manufacturers in the region (M o = ∅). Then, the hiring choice can be expressed in terms of the demand shocks (see Appendix):
where m I is the mean of shocks of integrated Þrms that do not contract ex ante:
A Þrst result is that no integrated manufacturer hires ex ante if α = 1 because 2cov(θ j , m I ) ≤var(θ j ) + var(m I ). A second result is that each integrated Þrm wants to hire ex ante for large risk aversion provided that there remains an integrated Þrm that does not contract ex ante (m I > 0).
We summarize these results in the following proposition. 
Labor Contracting and Outsourcing
Let us now consider the nature of labor contracting when some (M o = M − M I > 0) manufacturing Þrms outsource the provision of components. The makers of components are assumed to be free to enter both before the realization of demand shocks and subsequent to their realization. In the latter case, entry occurs until ex post proÞts are zero. Entry prior to the realization of the shocks occurs until expected proÞts are zero.
Smallness is a main feature of monopolistic competition in which component makers engage. Firms are so small that they do not anticipate having an impact on aggregate prices and outputs. However, smallness also has implications for the Þnancial management of Þrms because small Þrms usually have less access to Þnancial markets. In many regions, the intermediate sector often includes small family-run Þrms funded with limited and unsophisticated capital structures, perhaps built mainly around family assets. Also, it is more costly for investors to monitor smaller Þrms; the lack of collateral in small businesses usually restricts credit (See Audretsch and Elston, 2002) . Hence it seems natural to assume that small Þrms pay a larger risk premium on Þnancial investment than large Þrms do. This Þnancial issue becomes critical when Þrms consider offering labor contracts that commit them to speciÞc wage and employment levels. Therefore, small component producers are less likely to propose ex ante labor contracts than large manufacturing Þrms that, as we have supposed above, are able to absorb and manage risk with minimal cost.
To capture the differential costs that small Þrms incur in offering wage contracts, we assume that each component producer pays a premium as an additional Þxed cost (τ − 1)aw > 0 (τ > 1) that is proportional to the production Þxed cost a and to the realization of the wage. The total Þxed cost then becomes τ aw. The parameter τ could represent the transactions costs absorbed by small Þrms when dealing in Þnancial markets, including the extra staffing and other costs that a Þrm must incur when meeting auditing and control requirements for outside Þnancial counterparties. In the ex ante stage, a component producer i chooses its production x 0 (i) to maximize its ex ante proÞt given contractual wage w 0 . That is, the component producer maximizes
where, by (5),
The optimal output and proÞt are computed as
and
Component producers enter in the ex ante stage as long as they make non-negative proÞts, which is equivalent to the condition: x 0 (i) > τ x. This condition implies that wage offers remain low enough for entry to occur. Therefore, component producers enter ex ante if they are able to offer a wage w 0 such that
The Þrst inequality requires that the ex ante wage offers workers a level of utility as great as the expected utility that they obtain in the ex post market; the second inequality requires that the ex ante wage is low enough for the component makers to break even.
If the Þrst inequality is not satisÞed, workers are unwilling to contract ex ante, and if the second inequality is not satisÞed, then no Þrms wish to enter ex ante; in either case,
For expository purposes, we distinguish the conÞgurations of regions in which integrated Þrms offer ex ante labor contracts and those in which they do not. Let again insures that the price index for components will satisfy (7). Given this price index, the ex ante production of component producers will be
Therefore, the proÞtability condition x 0 (i) > x is equivalent to w 0 ≤ τ ρ−1 Ew and it follows that labor will be hired in the ex ante labor market if
We analyze the case of perfect and imperfect Þnancial markets in the region.
Perfect Financial Market. When τ = 1, the above condition is always satisÞed. When
Þnancial markets are perfect, free entry implies that the right-hand relationship is satisÞed as an equality (i.e., w 0 = Ew) while the fact that u(Ew) > Eu(w) implies that no workers are willing to be hired ex post. At the same time, since w 0 = Ew, x 0 (i) =x.
We therefore get the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that integrated Þrms (if any) only contract with workers ex ante
, and suppose that Þnancial markets in regions are perfect (τ = 1). Then, component producers always contract with workers ex ante. The ex ante level of output of each component is equal to its ex post level. Workers receive actuarially fair insurance against shocks (w 0 = Ew) and they have strictly higher utility than if component Þrms were not able to offer ex ante contracts.
When τ = 1, ex ante entry does not have any impact on ex post wages because the labor resources required by Þrms contracting ex ante, a + bx 0 (i), are exactly equal to the labor demand of the same Þrms if they hired workers ex post, a + bx. As a result, the expected utility of workers increases only through better insurance.
Imperfect Financial Markets. When Þnancial markets are not perfect, each component producer i must produce no less than τ x to break even. Because production of components is inversely related to the ex ante wage w 0 , component producers tend to offer lower wages as τ rises. However, when ex ante wages are too small, workers are unwilling to contract ex ante.
Ex ante wage depends on the anticipation of the level and variance of ex post wages.
In contrast to the case of perfect Þnancial markets in the region, we here need to make the wages explicit. Ex post wages are subject to two effects: a competition effect in the component market and a crowding out effect in the labor market. On the one hand, when a set of Þrms swaps from ex post to ex ante contracting, they depress their own component price and, through the component market competition, they also depress the price of ex post contracting Þrms. As result the ex post wage drops. To see this, note that ex post wages depend on the component prices p 0 (i) set by Þrms that offer ex ante contracts (see (11) and apply x 0 (i) = τ x), and on the component prices p set by the Þrms that enter and contract labor ex post (see (6) and apply x(i) = x). One readily checks that these prices satisfy the relationship, p 0 (i)/p = τ ρ−1 < 1. Firms contracting ex ante have higher Þxed costs to cover and they must then set higher outputs and lower prices.
Combining (5) and (6), one can eliminate the price index and get the price set by ex post contracting Þrms as it follows:
which, because τ > 1, decreases with N 0 . Hence, since p = bw/ρ, when Þrms swap from ex post to ex ante contracting, they harshen competition and depress the ex post wages.
On the other hand, when some Þrms swap from ex post to ex ante contracts, they crowd the ex post labor supply out and they force ex post wages to rise. Indeed, at the equilibrium, the ex post labor clears as it follows:
where the LHS is the labor demand by component makers that hire ex post and where the RHS includes the total labor supply minus the ex ante labor demands by integrated manufacturing Þrms and by component makers. Ex ante component makers require additional labor to pay the Þnancial transaction cost τ . Hence, when these Þrms swap from ex post to ex ante contracts, they crowd the ex post labor supply out and they push ex post wages up.
Using the last two expressions and the equalities p = bw/ρ and x 0 (i) = τ x we get the following ex post wage:
which increases in N 0 because τ > τ ρ . When manufacturing Þrms hire only ex ante Let us now study the situation in which component producers are just able to break even when they offer an ex ante wage that makes workers indifferent between ex ante and ex post contracting. That is, we look at the situation in which x 0 (i) = τ x and u(w 0 ) = Eu(w) = u(τ ρ−1 Ew). Two values of the Þnancial cost τ are of particular interest.
Let Þrst τ be that value of τ at which component makers respectively exhaust the full labor supply ex ante:
I . Let also denote by w 0 the value of the ex post wage under the same condition but when Ψ o = 1. The ex post wage is thus equal to
When Þnancial costs lie below this value, all component makers hire workers ex ante and exhaust ex ante the labor supply in the region.
Let then τ be the value of τ at which component makers respectively hire no worker ex ante (N 0 = 0). As previously, let also denote by w 0 the value of the ex post wage under the same condition but when Ψ o = 1. Note that because ex post wages increases in N 0 ,
we have that w 0 > w 0 . We then get
When Þnancial costs lie above this value, no component makers hire workers ex ante.
When they lie between τ and τ , component makers hire ex ante only a part of the labor supply.
Obviously the values of τ and τ tend to 1 when workers' risk aversion tends to zero.
In that case, workers put a low value on insurance and any small Þnancial cost impedes component producers to provide insurance. By contrast when workers are very risk averse, Þrms provide insurance even at large Þnancial costs.
Note that workers gain better insurance as well as higher average wages. Insurance by component producers occurs at a cost and that this cost increases the demand for workers, which raises their wages.
Proposition 5 Suppose that integrated Þrms (if any) only contract with workers ex ante
, and suppose that Þnancial markets in regions are imperfect (τ > 1). There exist two values of Þnancial cost (τ , τ ) such that (i) for τ ≤ τ , all component producers offer ex ante wage contracts, ex ante exhausting the labor supply. These contracts make workers better off (w 0 > Eu(w));
(ii) for τ < τ ≤ τ , some component producers offer ex ante wage contracts, hiring a portion of the labor force. Workers are indifferent between taking ex ante wage contracts (u(w 0 ) = Eu(w)) or not but equilibrium expected utility for workers is higher than if no ex ante contracts were offered; and (iii) for τ > τ , no component producer offers ex ante an wage contract (u(w 0 ) < Eu(w)).
The ranking of the thresholds (τ , τ ) depend on the properties of the utility function.
For constant relative risk aversion (u(w) = w α /α), the thresholds are independent of the wage level and are equal to τ = τ = τ 0 where
Hence only two industrial conÞgurations occur: either all or none component Þrms offer ex ante wage contract to workers.
Corollary 6 Suppose that workers have constant relative risk aversion. Then, there exists a τ 0 such that all component Þrms hire workers ex ante if τ < τ 0 and none of them offer hire workers ex ante otherwise.
It is here readily veriÞed that workers gain better insurance as well as higher average wages. Indeed, when all component Þrms hire ex ante, workers get the utility level u(w 0 )
which is above or equal to Eu
. By contrast, when none of them hire ex ante, workers get a lower utility level Eu
/α where w 0 < w 0 .
From the corollary, we also infer that τ < τ under decreasing relative risk aversion.
Then, the three conÞgurations of the last proposition exist. That means that when more component makers offer ex ante contract, ex post wages increase, which rises the ex ante wage and reduces the attractiveness of the component markets. In contrast, for increasing relative risk aversion, we have τ > τ . Then, only the industrial conÞgurations (i) and (iii) occur.
We now turn to regions including integrated Þrms without wage contracts (M 0 I < M I ). (ii) for τ > τ , no component producer ex ante offers wage contracts.
Integrated Manufacturers
Proof: see Appendix.
High wages offered by integrated manufacturers refrain component producers to hire the total labor supply as it can be the case in the previous section. In particular component producers are never able to exhaust the labor supply ex ante, even at τ = 1. Loosely speaking, this amounts to set τ = 1 and forbid item (i) in Proposition 5. Still, ex ante entry of component producers again pushes workers utility up through better insurance, and, through higher level of wages, as it is shown in expression (16) in the Appendix.
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the interactions between labor market pooling, structure of production and contracts to workers. By pooling in large regions, workers beneÞt from a larger labor demands and less volatile wages. By locating in large regions, Þrms beneÞt from Chamberlinian externalities which entice them to outsource the production of components. Firms also beneÞt from offering insurance to worker through Þxed wage contracts.
We develop a model a la Ethier (1982) in which Þrms have increasing returns to scale and produce their output assembling a set of components. Firms have CES production function and consumers iso-elastic demands. Firms Þrstly locate in a region, they secondly decide to outsource or integrate the production of their components, they thirdly choose to offer wage contracts to workers and they Þnally produce and sell their output. The model offers several interesting results.
Firms' outsourcing decisions may suffer from a coordination problem as, for a same set of economic parameters, equilibria with outsourcing, integration or both structures may co-exist. In particular, when a region develops by hosting new manufacturing Þrms, Þrms may be inefficiently locked in the integration structure. One has to assume the existence of institutional structures (city planning, zoning or collusion) to restore the efficient structure. Furthermore, when Þrms are not ex ante symmetric, Þrms may even not agree on the optimal structure and institutions must also arrange transfers between
Þrms.
The nature of contract to workers strongly depends on the structure of manufacturing Þrms in a region. First, integrated manufacturers have access to internal or global
Þnancial markets that allows them to insure against both demand risks and wage risks.
Integrated manufacturers are therefore enticed to offer insurance to workers through Þxed wage contracts. Yet workers' beneÞt from insurance is smaller in larger regions with more diversiÞed risks. Therefore, it turns out that integrated manufacturers tend not to con-tract with workers ex ante in large regions hosting many manufacturers with uncorrelated shocks but they offer ex ante contracts when shocks are strongly correlated. Manufacturers with shock sufficiently correlated with the ex post wage hire workers ex ante, whereas manufacturers with own shocks sufficiently negatively correlated to ex post wages do not hire ex ante. we get
Using, the Taylor approximation (1 + x) y ' 1 + xy, we get
which is the result in the text.
Using Taylor approximation for θ j around 1, we get Ψ
Hence the previous condition becomes
θ k , we get the following simple equivalence:
Proof of Proposition 7
In Proposition 7, component makers hire ex ante if this option gives them higher expected proÞt and gives workers higher expected utility. Expected proÞts and utility depend on 
We now need to determine the ex post wage. First, if there is ex post entry, ex post wage is a simple extension of (14) where the aggregate shock of integrated manufacturers that hire ex post adds to the aggregate shock of outsourcing manufacturers: (5) and (11). This gives the function
which is decreasing and convex function of N 0 .
To sum up, for each realization of state θ, the functions w and Ψ 
